

2nd Battle of Narvik 15 April.1940

Operation D.W.

Extracts from File M08047/40 (The National Archives)

Operations by HM Ships

Case 7442 5 – 13 April 1940

Case 7443 13 – 19 April 1940

Case 7444 20 – 26 April 1940

Case 7445 27 April – 3 May 1940

Case 7446 5 May – 13 June 1940

Naval Air Operations

Case 7447 8 April – 4 May 1940

Case 7448 6 May – 13 June 1940

Anti-Submarine Attacks and Measures

Case 7449

Bases – Military Operations

Case 7450 RM Operations. Bases

Case 7451 Military Operations. Intelligence Reports etc.

Miscellaneous

Case 7452

Narvik – Operations for Capture

Case 7453 Reports by P.O. Narvik (Lord Cork)

Case 7454 Progress Reports and Telegrams

Case 7455 Naval Requirements. Narvik Committee – telegram

Case 7456 Telegrams and Memoranda

Case 7457 Operational Telegrams

Case 7458 Operational Telegrams

Force B

WARSPITE – Captain V.A.C. Crutchley. VC DSC RN (Flying the flag of Vice Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Squadron)

BEDOUIIN – Commander J.A. McCoy

COSSACK – Commander R. St. V. Sherbrooke. Position A

ESKIMO – Commander St. John Aldrich Micklethwait. DSO

PUNJABI- Commander J. T. Lean

HERO- Commander Biggs. Position B

ICARUS- Lt Cdr C. D. Maud

KIMBERLEY – Lt Cdr R. G. E. Knowling

FORESTER – Lt Cdr E. S. Tancock DSO. Position P


FOXHOUND – Lt Cdr G. H. Peters. Position O

Aircraft from FURIOUS

Asdic range 1600 yards

Archivist note – This extract has, in the main, been typed as read from the file and may carry misspellings, duplicate messages, conflicting information and incorrect prose. (Skjelfjord appears in the file as Sjeld Fjord). The extract only tries to set the events in chronological order from the various reports in the file. The aerial photographs were taken by Warspite's aircraft and inserted where thought appropriate. (See MO7710/40 Part WHCase 7441). It is not known who took the photographs of the damage to COSSACK

Note. From Page 141. Reception of all Wireless Telegraphy (W/T) signals with the exception of 15 kc/s (Rugby), and to a lesser extent 51.5 kcs, and very local signals was extremely bad once ships were inside the Fjords. This was particularly noticeable in the approaches to Narvik east of longitude 16° 21' east



Google Earth

2012

Rombaks Fjord

Ofot Fjord

Narvik

HM Ships Eskimo and Cossack - Report of Proceedings

(2nd Battle of Narvik)

Page 172 onwards


HMS COSSACK 19 April 1940 (*Interspersed with information from the WARSPITE, other ships reports and the communication report from the same file*)

Sir

I have the honour to forward the following report of proceedings of HMS ship under my command during operation D.W. off Narvik on Saturday 13 April 1940.

2. The two parts of the force intended to carry out this operation joined company at 0730 and proceeded up West Fjord in the following order:- ICARUS with bow protective gear, HERO, FOXHOUND and FORESTER with T.S.D.S., ([Two Speed Destroyer Sweep. It consisted of paravanes attached to steel cables streamed out aft on either side of the stern.](#))

BEDOUIIN, PUNJABI and COSSACK and KIMBERLEY as a close A/S screen for WARSPITE



Copied from file

Weather – overcast, heavy melting snow clouds producing intermittent rain, wind south – west force 3 / 4, visibility 10 miles. Snow lay thickly on the mountains down to sea level. Weather cleared about 1600.

0743 – COSSACK to BC One by light – “As my point 5 MG has been defective, request permission to test with a few rounds

0747 – Signal from BCS to FURIOUS – “Commence air attack at the times stated in the orders for the operation.”

0757 – from BC One by light “Approved” (0743 signal)

0758 - BC One to COSSACK (and others) by light “Take screening diagram 4”

0801 – BC One to all destroyers by light - “Set watch on 565 kc/s and read H.D. routines.

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0815 – COSSACK to BC One by light – “Percentage of full stowage of oil fuel remaining at 0800 35% “

0915. The following signal was received from BC One by light –“We are proceeding to attack the defences of Narvik and any German or merchant ships met. I am sure that any resistance on the part of the enemy will be dealt with in the most resolute and determined manner. I wish you all every success”

1009 – Signal from BCS to all ships – “Operation D.W.

Paragraph (vi). Any sign of enemy activity on Baroy Island is to be destroyed by gunfire

Paragraph (vii). If a guide to fire distribution is necessary odd numbered destroyers take south side and even number take north side. Enemy war ships take precedence over shore targets.

Paragraph (viii) On arrival east of 17° east destroyers may use high speed but should not lose the support of Warspite’s fire. Any enemy warship in the fjord to the North of Narvik is to be provided for, before the harbour to the south is entered.

Paragraph (x) If ordered to withdraw the signal DBO by v/s and w/t will be used”

1030. 30 miles from the entrance to Ofot Fjord.

1045 – BC one to all by flag. – “Assume 1st degree of readiness with AA armament”

1058. Force B approaching ESKIMO off Tranoy Light.

3. ESKIMO who had been sent on ahead reported a submarine in sight bearing 240° which was attacked with depth charges between 1100 and 1108. ESKIMO then joined company. BEDOUIN also dropped 4 depth charges at 1110.

4. Before passing Baroy Island PUNJABI and ESKIMO formed astern of BEDOUIN as the starboard wing, KIMBERLEY and FOXHOUND astern of COSSACK as the port wing with ICARUS, HERO and FORESTER in the centre sweeping ahead of WARSPITE.

1142. 5 miles westward of Baroy Island Warspite’s aircraft flown off at 1152 for reconnaissance, to bomb suitable targets, to return to Skjelfjord. Screening destroyers move to van.

BEDOUIN, PUNJABI, ESKIMO to starboard COSSACK, KIMBERLEY and FORESTER to port.



Destroyers in Ofort Fjorden

A Swordfish from FURIOUS sighted. The aircraft observer concurred that there was nothing to bomb on Baroy Island and it returned to FURIOUS.

1203 Warspite's aircraft reported two enemy destroyers were off Framsk (68° 24' North 16° 49' East) and at 1250 that these destroyers were hiding in a bay 5 miles ahead of the screen and were in a position to fire torpedoes. The number was later corrected to one.

5. The first point at which the enemy gun defences had been reported was Baroy Island. This was passed at 1209, no fire being encountered or gun emplacement seen. A minefield had also been reported in the vicinity of the entrance to Tjeldsundet.

6. At 1228 one enemy destroyer was sighted ahead and the fire opened at extreme range at 1232.

1232. COSSACK to all by flag (flag 5) – "Fire may be opened"

As, however, the fall of shot could not be seen at this range fire was checked.

7. At 1247 fire was again opened on a single destroyer and at 1251 and 1257 two further enemy destroyers were sighted, these opened fire on the leading British ships at 1249, ICARUS being straddled at 1250.

1250 Warspite's aircraft via WARSPITE to COSSACK by W/T – 2 destroyers hiding in bay starboard side of fjord, one mile ahead of screen. Received by COSSACK at 1258.

9. Enemy batteries have also been reported either side of the entrance at Ramnes Point. This was passed at 1255 and no sign of enemy activities or of gun emplacements could be seen.

At 1300 a low wing monoplane thought to be a Dornier 17 was seen on the port beam proceeding down the fiord on opposite course.

1300 – From BC one by light – “Look out for destroyer hiding on starboard hand”

10. At 1303 the mean course was altered to 090° (by use of flag and light) towards Narvik. At the same time a signal was received from aircraft saying “look out for enemy destroyer in bay one mile ahead on starboard hand”

11. At 1305 another destroyer appeared out of Bogen Bay and shots began to fall in the vicinity of COSSACK at 1307. From this point the enemy ships, while keeping all the guns bearing, fought a retiring action up the fiord. The tactics of the British destroyers was to keep a solid front line and so provide numerous targets, altering courses and speeds as necessary to avoid enemy fall of shot.

While maintaining a steady and continuous pressure advancing up the fiord at a mean speed of some 12 to 14 knots.

12 Up to now, due to indifferent visibility, COSSACK had been engaging most likely target, but at 1310 fire was concentrated on the left hand ship. At this time ESKIMO was straddled and from now on the enemy had found our range and were firing with considerable accuracy.

13. At 1312 flashes of gunfire were observed on the starboard hand coming from Djupvik Bay. This turned out to be from the destroyer reported by Warspite’s aircraft. It was seen that PUNJABI opened fire with main armament and Pom Pom on this target. COSSACK was straddled and fired 3 salvos at 3300 yards, the third of which was seen to hit amidships. At this point the enemy was heavily on fire but still had some guns in action. As now, however, the target was clear for rear ships and COSSACK was heavily engaged from ahead, fire was shifted to the left hand ship of the three seen to be retiring towards Narvik.

14. By this time ICARUS, HERO and FORESTER had dropped back to get in their sweeping gear and the order of advance consisted of BEDOUIN, PPUNJABI, ESKIMO and COSSACK in approximately line abreast from starboard to port with KIMBERLEY and FOXHOUND in rear of COSSACK.

15. 1318 - Aircraft reported 5 torpedoes approaching and at 1322 course was altered to avoid a surface runner.

16. Between 1320 and 1347 COSSACK received 16 straddles or near misses. During this period the W/T aerial was shot away and a near miss at 46 station starboard perforated mess deck and No 2 provision room, flooding the latter and shipping a considerable amount of water on to the messdecks.

17. At 1331 while in a position 270° Narvik West Light 10 ³/₄ miles, a series of three or four bumps, as if striking a submerged object were felt.

1345. Sweeping destroyers hauled in their sweeps and subsequently proceeded in support of the destroyers of the striking force

18. At 1346 nine aircraft from FURIOUS were seen approaching Narvik along Ofot Fiord
19. At 1349 one torpedo passed close ahead and another under the bridge. Track bubbles were seen and it appeared that a low speed setting was in use.
20. At 1350 a lull occurred in the enemy firing, which was resumed four minutes later, when COSSACK was again straddled. At this point it was noticed that shore defences round Narvik were in action.
- 1352 Warspite's aircraft reported no destroyers in Skjomen Fjord.
- 1355 – COSSACK from BC One by W/T - “ EMERGENCY Look out for enemy destroyers in bays on starboard side”
21. At 1358 columns of smoke possibly caused by exploding torpedoes or by aircraft bombs were observed close to Narvik.
22. By this time an enemy had been seen close inshore on the port hand at the entrance to Herjangs Fjord. This was engaged by COSSACK and hits scored. (FOXHOUND reported this destroyer was silenced and burning)
- 1402 WARSPITE ordered destroyers to engage enemy destroyers
23. At 1406 PUNJABI received two or three direct hits, and made a large alteration to port.
24. At 1410 three surface running torpedoes were observed approaching from the direction of a destroyer off Narvik Point. The port engine was put to full speed astern and these avoided.
25. This destroyer was on fire but still in action with its after guns. As it was being engaged by more adjacent ships course was altered to port to engage an enemy retiring in the direction of Herjangs Fiord.
26. BC1s signal 1009 of 13 April stated that any enemy warship in fiord to the North of Narvik was to be provided for before the harbour to the south was entered. BEDOUIN's 1101 stated that BEDOUIN, PUNJABI and ESKIMO would go for any enemy in Herjangs Fiord and COSSACK and KIMBERLEY were to use their discretion when to attack ships in Narvik Harbour.
27. An aircraft report had been received of a large enemy destroyer in Narvik Harbour and it now being clear that the enemy in Herjangs and Rombaks fiords were being followed BEDOUIN, PUNJABI and ESKIMO decided to enter Narvik Harbour to sink any enemy merchant vessels as was deemed advisable.



Cossack approaching Narvik



Narvik Fjord from Warspite's seaplane.

Note destroyed enemy ship alongside near to where
COSSACK would go aground



Left: A view of Narvik harbour taken during the 2nd battle of Narvik, HMS Cossack near the wrecked transport *Bochenheim* in the foreground is engaging shore batteries at short range. *THM*



Cossack in Narvik Fjord

28. The position in the harbour of the enemy precluded more than one destroyer at a time engaging him at a decisive range, and at 1415 course was altered for the harbour and a signal sent to KIMBERLY to follow.

1420 – all from BC One by W/T – “You are doing grand”

29. When approaching the harbour no enemy destroyer could be seen (Cossack had steamed for the south side of the entrance) but on clearing the light house point the enemy came in sight near the wharf on the eastern side of the harbour at a range of 3000 yards. Both ships opened fire simultaneously COSSACK scoring a hit with the second salvo. The enemy fired 5 salvos and then his fire was silenced. Four hits were scored on COSSACK, the first of which penetrated the TS and necessitated local control. Another entered No 2 boiler room cutting the main steam pipe resulting in the immediate loss of steam, and also severed the telemotor leads, with the result that at 1422 COSSACK grounded forwards at the harbour entrance due south of Narvik occulting light. As there was a fire in the adjacent messdeck orders were given to flood “A” magazine.

1433 – COSSACK to all by flag and light – “Am aground” (south of Framnesoddon Point)



Google Earth 2012

Area of grounding



COSSACK aground in Narvik Fjord

1434 – COSSACK to BC One by light – “Am aground, have fire of destroyer in harbour”

30. Firing was continued at a range of 2000 yards until it was evident that the enemy had abandoned ship when the order to cease fire was given. With a view a view of boarding and taking the ship I ordered the only remaining sound boat – a whaler – to be armed and lowed.

1444. COSSACK to BC One by light – “No enemy opposition in Narvik Bay.

31. By this time the shore batteries had ceased firing. But besides the 9 ships sunk in the harbour there were some 13 at anchor or alongside quays and the situation in the harbour was no means clear. Although the object of the operation D.W. was the destruction of German warships-merchant ships and defences in Narvik area Vide CinC H.F. 1918/12 I did not wish to sink unnecessarily merchant shipping as we were now in command of the area. The ships appeared to be deserted but prevent any chance of scuttling by shore parties I considered that the presence of a destroyer inside the harbour was advisable.

32. KIMBERLEY had now come up, but had damage affecting his manoeuvrability had apparently been sustained, I ordered FOXHOUND to enter the harbour and investigate the situation.

(Foxhound report – “As I had only one gun which could fire ahead I decided to stand by Cossack but he would not let me tow him off as he might sink by the bow”)



FOXHOUND approaching COSSACK in Narvik Fjord

1450 FOXHOUND instructed by COSSACK to board silenced enemy destroyer laying at double pier opposite.

33. At 1510 FOXHOUND entered the harbour, (Foxhound's report puts this as 1500) but on approaching the enemy destroyer he was met by hot machine gun and rifle fire apparently from the shore in the vicinity. He then fired a few single rounds in to the destroyer which afterwards blew up and sank, and he then withdrew.

1532 – COSSACK to BC One by W/T – “While ordering FOXHOUND to approach German destroyer machine gun fire from shore was met with, 13 merchant ships in harbour, am taking no further action pending capture of these vessels, my damage considerable including all W/T; further signals will be made by V/S. German destroyer has now sunk.”

34. I reported the situation to the V.A Commander the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in WARSPITE first by v/s through FOXHOUND and then by w/s as soon as the aerial had been repaired. The enemy had received a hard blow and his warships were being rapidly destroyed. Their morals has undoubtedly suffered and while in this state it seemed to me a matter for serious consideration whether a landing party should not there and then be made to take the town.

1540 – FOXHOUND sends Medical Officer to COSSACK to assist with casualties.

1615 – COSSACK to BC One by W/T – “IMPORTANT Situation as follows. 3 holes forward on waterline before 30 bulkhead. Small holes above waterline abaft 30 bulkhead can be plugged. Consider with lightening forward and assistance of tow ship can be steamed stern first. At present is aground forward. All guns available in local control”

1631 – BC One from Cossack by W/T – “On ordering FOXHOUND to approach German destroyers / gunfire from shore was met with. 13 merchant ships in harbour probably about half German. Am taking no further offensive action unless attempts to scuttle are made. German destroyer has now sunk. Regret to report following casualties, 7 dead, 15 seriously wounded, 12 wounded. Consider town could be mopped up with a small force.”

1641 – COSSACK and FOXHOUND from BC One by W/T – “Report situation in Narvik Harbour.”

1651 BC One from FOXHOUND by light – “(Report on harbour activity)..... Am Picking up Germans and standing by COSSACK in case she is fired on. 5 sent to MO. Am sending MO. COSSACK’s damage looks considerable and he will not let me tow him off.”

35. At 1700 a howitzer opened fire up from behind the town. Its shooting was accurate at about 2 minute intervals. Shots fell correct for line 150, 75 and 25 yards over. The howitzer was not in sight from the ship and only the general direction from which the shots came could be gauged, however three salvos were fired at a small hill some 3500 yards distant, on which was seen a mast and some men, and the howitzer did not again fire. Gun flashes had also been reported from a merchant vessel alongside the quay, on which the Pom Pom opened up.

1715 – FOXHOUND to BC One by light – “ COSSACK being fired on”

1719 – BC One to COSSACK by light – “Are you being fired at and from what direction?”

1720 - Reply from COSSACK – “Am being fired at by field gun from port beam.”

BC one to FOXHOUND by 1724 by light – “Keep out of the way, am about to open fire”

1725 – COSSACK to BC One by light – “Fire in direction of fort”

1727 – BC One to Cossack by light – “Where is the fort that is firing”

1729 - BC One to COSSACK by light – “Have you silenced the fort?”

1731 – COSSACK to BC One by Light – “Firing appeared to come from merchant vessel.”

1745 – COSSACK to BC One by light - “ I think howitzer fired from the hill top bearing N. 35 E. 3500 yards from me. I think this is blind from you.”

1755 – COSSACK to BC One by light – “Would like to transfer 15 wounded to WARSPITE if possible”

36. The remaining ships taking part in the operation were seen to retire down the fiord soon afterwards and some little time later a report of 12 enemy aircraft approaching up the fiord was received.

37. In view of the situation with the ship aground 50 yards from the shore in shallow water I ordered the C.Bs and S.Ps to be burnt.

38. Narvik appeared deserted except for a few men who came down near the ships. One stated there were German soldiers in the town and when pressed for numbers said he thought about 2000. They appeared very glad that the German destroyers had been sunk. Another Norwegian on skis came down to inform us that a German submarine had been in harbour the previous day, telling us “for our own good”.

1826 – KIMBERLEY from BC One by light – “Remain at Narvik and endeavour to tow COSSACK to Skjelfjord”

1832 – to all from BC One W/T ?– “Am withdrawing. KIMBERLEY is to guard COSSACK withdrawing her if possible from Narvik Harbour. PUNJABI to guard ESKIMO”

1851 – BEDOUIN to BC One by light – “Have orders for ESKIMO and COSSACK been given please?”

1904 – BC One to KIMBERLEY by light – “Cancel my 1826. Find a safe place for COSSACK near Narvik”

WARSPITE signalled to COSSACK at 2050 - “All wounded are to be collected in PUNJABI to rendezvous with me in 17° East at Midnight” (*See next signal message*)

2126 – COSSACK / KIMBERLEY / PUNJABI from BC One by W/T – “All wounded are to be collected in PUNJABI to rendezvous with me in Opot Fjord in 017° E at midnight. PUNJABI will proceed with me and BEDOUIN stay with ESKIMO”

2134 from PUNJABI report “Orders were received to close COSSACK and embark her wounded – BC One signal times 2136 – Accordingly I proceeded to the entrance to Narvik Harbour. It was my intention to go alongside COSSACK whose bows were aground on the south shore but with so many wrecks in the harbour, a number of which had their masts showing above water, I felt the risk of damage did not justify my doing so. I therefore remained stopped at the entrance to the harbour while the wounded were brought over by COSSACK’s Whaler. After two boat loads had been embarked it was decided to leave the remaining six cases (Who were too seriously wounded to be moved by whaler) and to ask the Admiral to send for them by power boat. This he later did. I now proceeded to the westward and at 0022 on 14 April secured alongside WARSPITE in Ofot Fjord

and started the work of transferring the wounded. (Then lists number of wounded from Cossack, Punjabi and Eskimo) With this work complete I slipped from WARSPITE and then remained in company with the Admiral Commanding Battle Cruisers while he proceeded to Narvik to embark the remainder of COSSACKS's wounded and later withdrew from Ofot Fjord."

39. Between 1422 the time of grounding and 2030 when the attempt to tow off was made, steam was first raised I No 3 boiler, a dynamo restarted, investigations of damage and the necessary shoring carried out and the ship lightened as much as possible forward. The dead and wounded were removed and taken aft.

40. KIMBERLEY returned up the fiord at 2200 (See signal from BC1 at 1832) with orders to tow COSSACK off, failing which to stand by. An unsuccessful attempt was made re-float the ship at 2015. (According to the report from Kimberley she passed a 4" wire over her forecastle to Cossack's stern and veered 3 cables of shackle and commenced to pull with 130 revolutions at 2015 but the pendant parted) I then arranged for a further attempt to be made at 0400, one hour before the next high water, and ordered KIMBERLEY to maintain a patrol.

2206 from COSSACK to BC One and CinC Home Fleet by W/T "CONFIDENTIAL All cypher and C.Bs have been destroyed except Naval Cypher and Administration Code

41. PUNJABI returned at 2230 and six wounded were transferred by whaler for onward passage to WARSPITE.

42. The enemy destroyer which had been silenced off Narvik Point continued to drift down the fiord until 2330, when the oil tanks burst. The ship finally sank at 0030.

43. At 0315 COSSACK was able to get off under her own power and WARSPITE then having returned I went alongside to transfer 15 seriously wounded. (0326 - 0540 14 April 1940)

0520 – FOXHOUND report – "In Ofot Fjord COSSACK and ESKIMO returning stern first with escorts. No apparent shore activity."

44. COSSACK then proceeded stern first with FORESTER as escort to Skjelfjord (68° 00' N 13° 15' E) arriving at 1645.

45. COSSACK was ashore 50 yards from the land at the entrance to Narvik Harbour from 1422 until 0315 the following morning. During this time only three howitzer rounds and a few stray rifle bullets were fired at the ship and no other offensive action taken by the enemy. I can not think that COSSACK had the luck to hit a howitzer whose whereabouts was only vaguely known. The Germans it seems either suffered from a shortage of ammunition (but FOXHOUND received hot fire) or to an outstanding lack of initiative.

46. I should like to call attention to the support I received from my two heads of departments, and to pay tribute to the excellent behaviour of the ship's company throughout the action and the high morale sustained during a trying interval when the remaining British warships had apparently left and COSSACK was aground in a particular vulnerable situation.

(a) The First Lieutenant P.W. Gretton had only joined the ship 8 days prior to the action. In this short time he had achieved a knowledge of the ship and of its fighting powers, which enabled him to carry out his duties in action and afterwards when the ship was grounded in a damaged and flooded condition, with marked success. His leadership of a necessarily unknown ship's company was of the highest order.

(b) During the action, with continuous large alterations of course and speed, the E.R. Department answered every call made upon them. Afterwards under the direction of the Engineering Officer Lieutenant Commander W. F. B. Lane the difficult situation which arose from damage, flooding and grounding, was admirably and rapidly dealt with

47. I regret to have to report the following casualties:- (for detailed list see appendix 5)

Killed	9
Seriously wounded since died	2
Seriously wounded	3
Wounded	9
Slightly wounded	7
Total	30

I have the honour to be

Sir

Your obedient Servant

Cdr. R. St V. Sherbrooke

Commander in Command


Action damage

1. Entered at stations Port 17-18 1 foot below lower deck, passed horizontally through No 20 bulkhead and left stations Starboard 26 $\frac{1}{4}$ - 27 $\frac{1}{2}$. Flooded No 2 central store and No 1 provision room.
2. Stations Port 13 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ between lower and upper decks. Hole about 5 feet diameter. Ship's side between 13 and 25 stations Port severely damaged by perforation. No 1 Central store wrecked
3. Stations Port 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 19 between upper and forecastle decks. Hole 6 feet by 4 feet. Ship's side perforated 15 $\frac{1}{2}$ - 26 stations Port.

4. Stations Port 46 – 48 between upper and forecastle decks. Hole 3 ½ feet by 5 feet and ship's side perforated between static port 44 and 50.
5. Stations Port 40 – 43 in fore superstructure. Hole 5 feet by 4 feet. Screen wrecked to 48 station Port. Gun support perforated and oil supply pipe to “B” gun damage.
6. Near miss. Stations Starboard 42 ½ - 42 ½ from 2 feet below lower deck to about 4 feet above. Ship's side severely perforated. No 2 provision room flooded.
7. Stations Port 93 ½ - 95 just below upper deck. Burst inside No 2 boiler room lifting deckhead. Main steam pipe fractured. Loss of steam and putting machinery temporary out of action. No 98 bulkhead between Nos. 2 and 3 boiler room perforated.
8. Burst on backstay of mast perforated foremast.














Extracted from pages 213 on.

In action off Narvik 13 April 1940 against German destroyers.

During, but towards the end of the action, COSSACK received several hits at close range from a German destroyer. COSSACK destroyed the enemy and eventually run aground but got off under her own steam.

The major damage sustained by the various hits is as follows:

- (i) One shell hole in forward upper crew space. A large hole in ship's side (Port) and hull in vicinity extensively perforated. The exhaust steam pipe from the capstan engine was carried away.
- (ii) Another exploded in No 1 Naval Store. There is a large hole in the ship's side (Port) and hull, bulkheads and decks in vicinity extensively perforated by splinters.

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- (iii) Another shell entered No 2 Naval store Port side just above the waterline, turning aft through two bulkheads and went out the Starboard side of the Cool Room, just above the waterline, without exploding.
- (iv) Another shell entered No 2 Provision /Room Starboard side just above the waterline and exploded. There is a comparatively small hole where it entered but hull in the vicinity and deck over is extremely perforated. Some splinters entered the A/S Office.
- (v) Another exploded in the after crew space on the upper deck. There is a large hole in the ships side (Port) and considerable perforations of the hull and bulkheads in the vicinity. Splinters through the fuse board in the Transmitting Station put the T/S out of action.
- (vi) Another exploded in the Petty Officer's Mess and did considerable damage and killed a member of the supply party. There is a large hole in the superstructure (Port) and considerable perforations of the plating and "B" gun support in the vicinity. Pour to "B" gun was interrupted by a broken pipe.
- (vii) Another entered No 2 Boiler Room on the Port side just below the upper deck and exploded. Hole in the ship's side is not large. Splinters holed the main steam pipe to No 1 Boiler and made a deep nick in the Port main steam pipe to No 2 Boiler. Steam to the fans was carried away. The port telemotor leads in No 2 Boiler Room, which were in use at the time, were broken and threw the steering gear out of action in consequence of which COSSACK grounded forward up to 30 station. She got off under her own power. The fans casing in No 2 Boiler Room were badly distorted but fans can be turned by hand.
- (viii) A shell hit the forward funnel backstay and exploded. The forward funnel is riddled by splinters.

As a result of the damage the following compartments flooded.

No 2 Naval Store, No 1 Provision Store, No 2 Provision Store, Cool Room.

The Starboard Magazine forward was flooded intentionally because of fire but was pumped out soon afterwards. Temporary shores were at once fitted to the flooded compartments and COSSACK steamed stern first to Skjelfjord escorted by FORESTER to make temporary repairs.

The help of Mr Krogsted, Civil engineer, Statend-Havnevesen, Kabebveg, was brought in to effect repairs. He had cutting and welding apparatus and brought 15 men from the village which is 40 miles away on the mainland. The men worked from 7 am to 8 pm and worked well provided they were given plenty to eat. They returned home each evening.

The ammunition and stores forward were moved to aft which brought the large holes in the hull forward above the water line. The small splinter holes in the flooded compartments were plugged with wooden plugs. All flooded compartments were then pumped out and this brought all the holes above water.

The rough edges of all the holes were cut off and the holes blanked by bolted or riveted plated with insertion backing as necessary. The hull will be reasonably watertight when this is complete.

The A/S training motor was flooded. This being dried out and it is hoped to have the A/S working before COSSACK sails.

Temporary repairs are being made to the T/S.

The exhaust steam pipe from the capstan is repaired by flexible hose.

Broken pipe of power to "B" gun has been made good.

COSSACK will be ready to sail about 25 April. She will have steam on No 3 boiler and on left hand side of No 1 boiler. 90 Tons of oil fuel remained on 17th instant so she will have to refuel before sailing.

Draughts on 17th were:

Forward 10' 1 ½ "

Aft 13' 10 ½ "

All temporary shoring will be removed when repairs are complete.

COSSACK is to be repaired at Thornycrofts, Southampton.

German losses

Diether von Roder

Hans Ludermann

Wolfgang Zenker

Bernd von Arnim

Erich Giese

Erich Koellner

Hermann Kunne

Georg Thiele

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